“White House officials say the administration has undertaken a review on whether to release the [28 redacted] pages but has no timetable for when they might be made public.” -NY Times
A convincing case can be made that Barack Obama decided to protect the Saudi sponsors of the September 11th attacks as soon as he won the presidency in 2008:
Obama literally had his “Justice” (sic) Department aid and abet the Saudi terror financiers and stood against the American victims of the 9/11 attacks. Obama sided with Saudi terrorists over US victims of 9/11, in one of the most shameful displays in the history of this country, something I will “never forget,” nor forgive. Obama betrayed America, as proven beyond any shadow of a doubt in the above link from May 29, 2009. But many, many people also betrayed America. The president is not alone there.
“[Senator Bob] Graham has repeatedly said it shows that Saudi Arabia was complicit in the Sept. 11 attacks. “The 28 pages primarily relate to who financed 9/11, and they point a very strong finger at Saudi Arabia as being the principal financier,” Mr. Graham said last month as he pressed for the pages to be made public.
NY Times, of course, allows Zelikow to LIE:
“Philip D. Zelikow, the executive director of the national commission that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks after the congressional panels, said the commission followed up on the allegations, using some of the same personnel who wrote them initially, but reached a different conclusion.”
Far from following up Zelikow FIRED a Commission staffer for simply getting a copy of the 28 pages and reading it. Where’s that part of the story, NY Times?
Two investigators on the 9/11 Commission, Mike Jacobson and Dana Leseman, compile a list of interviews they want to do to investigate leads indicating that two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, were linked to elements of the Saudi government. The list is submitted to Philip Zelikow, the commission’s executive director, for approval. However, a few days later Zelikow replies that the twenty interviews requested is too much, and they can only do half the interviews. Leseman, a former Justice Department lawyer, is unhappy with this, as it is traditional to demand the widest range of documents and interviews early on, so that reductions can be made later in negotiations if need be.
‘We Need the Interviews’ – Leseman tells Zelikow that his decision is “very arbitrary” and “crazy,” adding: “Philip, this is ridiculous. We need the interviews. We need these documents. Why are you trying to limit our investigation?” Zelikow says that he does not want to overwhelm federal agencies with document and interview requests at an early stage of the investigation, but, according to author Philip Shenon, after this, “Zelikow was done explaining. He was not in the business of negotiating with staff who worked for him.”
More Conflicts – This is the first of several conflicts between Zelikow and Leseman, who, together with Jacobson, had been on the staff of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and had researched this issue there. Shenon will write: “Leseman was that rare thing on the commission: She was not afraid of Zelikow; she would not be intimidated by him. In fact, from the moment she arrived at the commission’s offices on K Street, she seemed to almost relish the daily combat with Zelikow, even if she wondered aloud to her colleagues why there had to be any combat at all.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 109-111]
Later Fired, Evidence Deleted from Final Report – Zelikow will later fire Leseman from the commission for mishandling classified information (see April 2003and (April 2003)) and will have the evidence of the Saudi connection gathered by Jacobson and Leseman’s successor, Raj De, deleted from the main text of the commission’s report (see June 2004).