FULL Story: Trump/Biden-Ukraine Corruption & Impeachment Media Ignores

Trump already exploiting this Ukraine fiasco in his campaign ads.

 

America’s Covert Assault on #Venezuela

Trump’s “Interim President” of Venezuela

 

The Making of Juan Guaidó: How the US Regime Change Laboratory Created Venezuela’s Coup Leader

Pilger: “Vichy Journalism” State Propaganda

 

 

Russian Military Power is No Joke

 

Here’s the real reason the US must talk to Russia

Democrats and the Crisis of Legitimacy

 

Unfortunately, this isn’t particularly new. It is a good analysis of the two-party fraud of a system though.

Democrats and the Crisis of Legitimacy

How Kubrick Adapted The Shining

 

Postol: French Intelligence Lied About Sarin “Signature”

 

Theodore A. Postol Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Flawed Chemical Analysis in the French Intelligence Report of April 26, 2017 Alleging a Syrian Government Sarin Nerve Agent Attack in Khan Sheikhoun of April 4, 2017

 

The sequence of steps that result in sarin being transformed into DIMP which FIR implies is a unique signature associated with sarin produced by the Syrian government. In fact, DIMP could easily be produced in many circumstances from the normal breakdown of sarin after its use. The point that DIMP is an expected product to be found in the aftermath of a sarin attck is made in a statement from United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) which is an arm of the Center for Disease Control (CDC). The ATSDR document that describes DIMP can be found at https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp119-c1-b.pdf. We quote from this document below: Diisopropyl methylphosphonate, or DIMP, is a chemical by-product resulting from the manufacture and detoxification of GB (also called Sarin), a nerve gas that the Army produced from 1953 to 1957. … You might find diisopropyl methylphosphonate in places where GB has been produced, stored, or used, for example, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) outside of Denver, Colorado. It is therefore clear that if the FIR analysis that led to the identification of sarin as being produced by the Syrian government would have led to the same unsupported conclusion from the FIR if it were applied to an indigenous sarin attack in Denver Colorado. This would particularly be the case if a sarin dispersing munition similar to the one described by FIR in the sarin nerve agent attack of April 29, 2013 was used in the postulated indigenous attack. That particular munition had a small charge of military explosives to rupture the container and disperse the sarin. The explosive would have certainly produced hexamine as a byproduct. The hexamine could have readily broken the fluorine bonds on some of the sarin residue leading to the production of DIMP. However, this is not the only path for producing DIMP the residues from a sarin attack.